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Defense, Growth, and 
Disarmament: A Reply 
P. C. FREDERIKSEN AND ROBERT E. LOONEY 
In a recent article in this journal, Lipow1 discusses our 1989 
article (LF 1989),2 which had summarized some of our earlier 
work on the relationship between defense spending and eco-
nomic growth in developing countries (LDCs). These studies, 
labeled as "unconvincing" by Lipow, indicated that defense 
spending may promote economic growth in the richer LDCs, 
which consequently might hinder any attempt to disarm. Li pow 
suggests that we "ignore the possibility that defense outlays 
could be replaced by development expenditures that will almost 
certainly generate higher growth rates"3 and asserts that internal 
security problems and verification procedures are in any case an 
even greater obstacle to disarmament. He lists three "troubling 
problems" with LF 1989: da~ reliability, financial versus eco-
nomic costs, and the possibility of a spurious correlation. 
As already noted, the primary objective in LF 1989 was to 
summarize some of our recent research on military spending in 
developing countries and specifically its effect on economic 
growth. Our research has spanned nearly a decade and includes 
numerous papers, six of which are cited in LF 1989. Thus we, in 
tum, are troubled because Lipow refers to just one of these 
papers-{)ur 1983 (and earliest) study"-and ignores the remain-
der. On the one hand, Li pow describes FL 1983 as "a careful and 
well-conceived study," and on the other hand as an exercise in 
"correlation hunting" and "rococo econometrics."5 We are also 
puzzled as to why-seven years later-{)ur 1983 study is singled 
out, especially since most of the issues raised by Lipow were 
raised by Ball6 in 1985 and replied to by us7 in the same year. 
FL 1983 extended Benoit's earlier work.8 Our contribution 
was to hypothesize that the effect of defense spending on eco-
nomic growth might be positive for the richer LDCs and negative 
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for the poorer ones. In other words, LOCs are not homogeneous 
and should not be lumped together. Using cluster analysis, we 
split Benoit's sample into two groups and then reestimated 
Benoit's model for each group. Lipow concludes that our data 
was drawn "from the same sources as all [?] the other studies 
dealing with this issue,"9 and that our results suggested "that no 
significant relationship existed between defense expenditures 
and growth among resource-constrained LOCs."1° First, we 
used Benoit's data, and second, we concluded that the coefficient 
for the defense variable in the resource-constrained group was 
"negative and statistically significant at the 99% level."11 
A major concern of Lipow is data reliability. Lipow notes 
that data generally comes from the US Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency (ACDA) or the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. He states that both organizations draw "most'' 
of their data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 
addition, he believes there is systematic disinformation in the 
reporting of military expenditures. In recent discussions with 
officials from ACDA,12 we were assured that at most 30 percent 
of their published data were based on IMF statistics. For the 
remainder, ACDA relies on other agencies-the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency-and their 
own in-house assessments. Whenever a country is suspected of 
underreporting military expendHures, ACDA revises the data 
upward.13 However, even if a systematic bias did exist, the bias 
would "wash out" since most studies deal with economic growth 
over time. 
Li pow argues that "defense expenditures, as reflected in the 
official budgets of militaries, do not always reflect the actual 
economic costs incurred"14 and that this gap could further distort 
our study. By splitting countries into resource-constrained and 
resource-unconstrained groups, we have explicitly accounted 
for the higher opportunity costs in the former group. We hy-
pothesize that since the resource-constrained group will face 
higher opportunity costs associated with defense expenditures, 
ceteris paribus, the impact of the defense expenditure on eco-
nomic growth would be negative. Similarly, the lower opportu-
nity costs in the relatively unconstrained countries are likely to 
result in a positive impact of military budgets on economic 
growth. 
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Lipow's third concern is that the statistical relationship 
observed in FL 1983 (or Benoit?) might be spurious.15 He sug-
gests that an additional variable-security threat-might ex-
plain the observed correlation. Lipow computed a Spearman 
Rank correlation coefficient of .489 for 40 of Benoit's 44 countries 
between GNP growth (a continuous variable) and a (discrete) 
dummy variable taking on the values from 1 to 4 to measure the 
security threat. Lipow concluded that (a) there existed a "strong 
relationship between the presence of external security threats 
and accelerated economic growth," and (b) that "the results of 
this Spearman test are not conclusive."16 Even ignoring the 
statistical difficulties of rank correlating discrete and continuous 
variables, if Li pow had been referring to our paper (rather than 
Benoit) presumably he would have computed the correlation 
coefficients for our two groups instead of for another subset of 
Benoit's total sample. 
We of course recognized some of the problems inherent in 
Benoit's study (small sample and early time period), and subse-
quently have conducted further statistical tests with larger 
samples, more recent data, and different economic models. These 
studies, which are ignored by Lipow, confirm for the most part 
the results of our 1983 study especially regarding the effect of 
military expenditures on economic growth in the rieher LDCs.17 
Li pow concludes by suggesting various alternatives to mili-
tary expenditures to promote economic growth. For example, he 
asserts that "civilian investments are likely to generate higher 
economic returns," and that "the military's role as trainer and 
educator could also be fulfilled by civilian institutions," and that 
"if the savings derived from disarmament are channeled into 
realistic and well-managed efforts, growth will almost certainly 
be accelerated" (italics added).18 We would more than welcome 
citations of analytical studies to support these speculations. In 
this regard, we note several recent publications that lend support 
to our position: on the effect of internal versus external factors 
on military expenditures,19 on the role of military versus civilian 
regimes in economic growth,2° and on the positive economic 
growth that arms-producing nations enjoy as compared to non-
arms producers.21 These recent studies refute-or at least cast 
serious doubt on-Lipow's speculative conclusions. 
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